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DANGEROUSNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE DECISION TO RELEASE
PERSONS ACQUITTED BY REASON OF INSANITY*
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN-f and JAY KATZ±
Ox July 10, 1958, following the trial of Edith L. Hough for murder in the
District of Columbia she was found not guilty by reason of insanity." Con-
sequently she was committed to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital for treatment and
custody. On October 20, 1958, approximately three months later, Dr. Winfred
Overholser, the hospital's superintendent, notified the trial court that "Miss
Hough has now recovered sufficiently to be granted her conditional release
... "2 In response to an objection by the United States Attorney, a hearing
was held before a trial judge who, after listening to the testimony of several
psychiatrists, denied the release and directed the superintendent to discontinue
his practice of allowing Miss Hough to leave the hospital for short periods
during the day, except when in the custody of a hospital attendant. The judge
found that she had not "recovered her sanity" and that it had not been estab-
lished that she "will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to herself or
others."13 In reaching his decision, he found that the psychiatric testimony
demonstrated that Miss Hough was still suffering from a schizophrenic reaction
of the paranoid type and that she lacked any insight concerning the serious-
ness of the killing. He also took into account the shortness of the lapse of time
since trial because he felt early release would be in conflict with the function
of detention as a means of imposing punishment.
4
These proceedings, which followed the verdict of acquittal by reason of in-
sanity, were held pursuant to the District of Columbia statute which provides:
(d) If any person tried.., for an offense... is acquitted solely on the
ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, the court shall
order such person to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill.
(e) Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally
ill pursuant to subsection (d) ... and the superintendent of such hospital
certifies (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in the
opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable future
*This article, prepared at the invitation of the Editors of the Journal of Nervous and
Mental Diseases in response to Szasz, T. S., "Civil Liberties and Mental Illness," appears
in a slightly condensed version concurrently in the Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases.
"Professor of Law, Yale University.
fAssociate Professor of Law, Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Yale Univer-
sity.
1. Brief for Appellee, p. 2, Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
2. Ibid.
3. Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
4. Ibid; see note 9 infra and accompanying text.
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be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the super-
intendent, the person is entitled to his unconditional release from the hos-
pital, and such certificate is filed with ... the court in which the person
was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney ....
such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the court to order the un-
conditional release of the person so confined from further hospitalization
at the expiration of fifteen days from the time said certificate was filed...
but the court in its discretion may, or upon objection of the United States
[Attorney] . . .shall, after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence
as to the mental condition of the person so confined may be submitted,
including the testimony of one or more psychiatrists from said hospital.
The court shall weigh the evidence and, if the court finds that such person
has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous
to himself or others, the court shall order such person unconditionally
released .... Where, in the judgment of the superintendent of such hos-
pital, a person confined under subsection (d) above is not in such con-
dition as to warrant his unconditional release, but is in a condition to be
conditionally released under supervision, and such certificate is filed ...
[it] shall be sufficient to authorize the court to order the release.., under
such conditions as the court shall see fit at the expiration of fifteen days
from the time such certificate is filed and served . . . . Provided, That
the provisions as to hearing prior to unconditional release shall also apply
to conditional releases.5
The trial court's interpretation of this statute was reviewed, and reversed
in part, by the Court of Appeals.6 It affirmed that even temporary leaves are
regulated by the release statute and are to be treated as conditional releases.
It reversed and ordered a new hearing on the ground that the lower court had
ignored the essential distinction between the criteria f9 r conditional and un-
conditional releases.7 The opinion emphasized the Vnderlying policy of the
statute, "to provide treatment and cure 8 for the individual [as a 'patient' not
a 'prisoner'] in a manner which affords reasonable assurance for the public
safety."
9
5. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VIII 1960). (Emphasis added.)
6. 271 F.2d 458.
7. Judge Bazelon indicated that an unconditional release will be granted where it ap-
pears that a patient has "recovered his sanity" and will not be "dangerous" to himself or
others. On the other hand, he construed the statute to authorize conditional release where
"insanity" and "dangerousness" persist, so long as the "proposed conditions" of release
provide adequate external safeguards against his being "dangerous" to himself or others.
See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
8. This may be a typographical error--"care" not "cure" was probably intended.
9. Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1959). At a later period the
court stated :
[W]e must reject the District Court's suggestion that appellant is a 'prisoner.'
Nothing in the history of the statute-and nothing in its language-indicates that
an individual committed to a mental hospital after acquittal of a crime by reason
of insanity is other than a patient .... Any preoccupation by the District Court with
the need of punishment for crime is out of place in dealing with an individual who
has been acquitted of the crime charged.
[Vol. 70: 225
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The procedures described call into question the extent to which the com-
munity, through its legislature, courts, and mental hospitals, has a role to play
in determining the detention or release of persons committed to mental insti-
tutions as a consequence of an acquittal by reason of insanity. This in turn
raises the question of how and which community agencies are to share respon-
sibility for such determinations. One body of opinion regards courts as peculiar-
ly ill-suited to judge the readiness for release of persons acquitted by reason
of insanity. The leading exponent of this position, Dr. Thomas Szasz, briefs
the argument rhetorically:
[I]f a psychiatrist in charge of a patient-who is not a convicted crim-
inal !-regards him, in his own best judgment, as ready to leave a hospital
* . . how can he, in his professional conscience, let a court tell him that
this he can not do? What is a psychiatrist "treating" the patient for, any-
way? To make him a good "prisoner"? The farcical, were it not tragic,
character of the notion of mental illness is well illustrated by these impos-
sible dilemmas into which psychiatrists and lawyers place themselves, each
other, their patients, and their clients.
Szasz seems to conclude that psychiatrists should be the exclusive judges
of a patient's fitness for release from a mental institution to which he has been
confined following a criminal trial:
[A]cquittal by reason of insanity, followed by automatic commitment,
seems to lead by easy steps to preventive jailing (hospitalization) of per-
sons because of their alleged future dangerousness .... While the court
has the right to order commitment, once a patient has been committed he
comes under the jurisdiction of the hospital authorities. Hospital psychia-
trists should be able to release the patient should they wish to do so. 10
The Szasz position rests primarily on a question-begging assumption. That
assumption, which will be discussed in an evaluation of the function of these
release procedures," is that an acquittal by reason of insanity is equated with
all other acquittals in the criminal process.12 For example, he maintains that
10. Szasz, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness-Some Observations on the Case of Miss
Edith L. Hough, 131 J. oF NERvous DisEASEs 58, 60 (1960).
11. See text following note 19 infra.
12. Historically this is not a valid assumption. See, e.g., Trial of James Hadfield, 27
State Trials 1281, 1353-55 (K.B. 1800).
Lord Kenyon.
With regard to the law, as it has been laid down, there can be no doubt upon earth;
to be sure, if a man is in a deranged state of mind at the time, he is not criminally
answerable for his acts; but the material part of this case is, whether at the very
time when the act was committed this man's mind was sane. I confess, the facts
proved by the witnesses (though some of them stand in near relationship to the
prisoner, yet others do not) bring home conviction to one's mind, that at the time
he committed this offence, and a most horrid one it is, he was in a very deranged
state. I do not know that one can run the case very nicely; if you do run it very
nicely, to be sure it is an acquittal.... It is impossible that this man with safety to
society can be suffered, supposing his misfortune is such, to be let loose upon the
1960]
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acquittals qualified "by reason of insanity" are equivalent to such outright un-
qualified acquittals as those based on the state's failure to establish that the in-
dividual charged committed the criminal act, or those based on findings that
the acts complained of were excused for such accepted reasons as self-defense
or official authorization.1" This assumption leads to the conclusion that persons
such as Hough should be treated, so far as release procedures are concerned,
as "bona fide innocent,"' 4-whatever that phrase may mean. It may mean, as
Szasz seems to imply, that the community has no interest in the decision of
when to release a person who, though acquitted, has demonstrated an ability,
not merely a propensity, to commit dangerous acts.' 5
To determine criteria for release of those acquitted by reason of insanity, it
becomes necessary first to establish the rationale for automatic commitment to
public .... The prisoner, for his own sake, and for the sake of society at large, must
not be discharged; for this case which concerns every man of every station, from
the king upon the throne to the beggar at the gate; people of both sexes and of all
ages may, in an unfortunate frantic hour, fall a sacrifice to this man, who is not
under the guidance of sound reason; and therefore it is absolutely necessary for the
safety of society, that he should be properly disposed of, all mercy and humanity
being shown to this most unfortunate creature. But for the sake of the community,
undoubtedly, he must somehow or other be taken care of, with all the attention and
all the relief that can be afforded him.
For an interesting problem stemming from the difference between an acquittal by reason
of insanity and an outright acquittal see Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52, 54-55 (D.C.
Cir. 1956):
The contention on appeal is principally that evidence of the diseased mental con-
dition of the accused requires us to hold that the trial judges should have directed
verdicts of acquittal on the grounds of insanity...
The United States first suggests that such a direction would have been uncon-
stitutional because if it had been given then the trial court would have been required
to confine accused to St. Elizabeth's Hospital pursuant to section 24-301 of the Code,
which would have deprived him of an opportunity to obtain an outright acquittal at
the hands of the jury. But Douglas was not deprived of the opportunity to be acquitted
outright because the cases went to the juries without the direction, and we accord-
ingly need not decide the suggested constitutional question.
Id. at n.2:
If such a question exists in other circumstances the trial court may avoid it by
allowing the jury to arrive at a verdict, as was here done, and then, if the verdict
is one of guilty, entering a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity notwith-
standing the verdict should the court conclude that this were required. It is also
probable in most instances that the constitutional difficulty could be avoided by an
instruction that unless jury acquit outright, as they may, they should return a ver-
dict of not guilty on the ground of insanity.
13. Szasz, supra note 10, at 59. Examples of authorized killings are the use of deadly
force by a police officer to effect an arrest and by an executioner to administer the death
penalty.
14. Szasz, supra note 10, at 59.
15. That an "acquittal by reason of insanity" implies commission of the unlawful act
charged, is illustrated in the corresponding British terminology, "guilty but insane." RoYAL.
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 RaPOT at 156 (Cmd. 8392).
[Vol. 70: 225
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a mental institution of a person thus acquitted. Logic would dictate, if Szasz is
correct, that such persons, being "bona fide innocent," should be given their lib-
erty subject only to the "civil" commitment procedures that are applicable to us
all. But even assuming the validity of the "innocence" assumption and the logical
conclusion therefrom, this does not move us very far. Whether commitments to a
mental institution be via a "civil" or "criminal" route their functions are sub-
stantially the same: that "mentally ill" persons who evidence dangerousness
to themselves or others be provided by the state with custody and care even
if there is no known effective therapy or therapy is unavailable. Commitment
procedures, however labelled, constitute a sanction, so far as the person con-
fined is concerned, in the form of deprivation of liberty, at least to the extent
that commitment is without regard to his "wishes."' 16 And a society free of
such sanctions is difficult to visualize. It would require that each individual be
so enlightened and free that he can become aware of his dangerousness and
commit himself for the benefit of the community. Unlike a diagnosis of con-
tagious tuberculosis (free of mental complications), cases involving mental
disease may involve such distortions of reality that such awareness becomes
even theoretically impossible.
Though the function of commitment to mental institutions is substantially
the same, whether by a "civil" or "criminal" tribunal, the issues to be deter-
mined by each tribunal are different. In civil dispositions primary emphasis is
placed on the current mental state of the individual to determine his commit-
ability. In the criminal procedure, on the other hand, primary emphasis is
focused on past mental state--at the time of the offense 17--to determine
16. "Implicit in the word 'sanction' ... is involuntariness. In this context involuntari-
ness is not treated as a psychological concept. Thus, for example, imprisonment is
a sanction even if imposed on a person who commits a crime in order to be punished
or in order to escape cold and hunger in the 'warmth' of a jail."
Goldstein, J., Police Discretion to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions
in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yau L.J. 543, 544 n.4 (1960).
Likewise, involuntary commitment of the mentally ill is a sanction even though it might
be considered a secondary gain.
17, The determination of mental state at the time of the offense has been a time-honored
element of insanity--defense tests and has been retained under Durham's jury instruction:
"If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not suffering from
a diseased ... mental condition at the tine he committed the crinminal act charged, you may
find him guilty." Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). (Emphasis
added.) Thus if the jury believes there was no mental disease at the thie of offense it can-
not proceed to determine the second major question, which under Durham is whether a
causal relationship exists between the mental disease and the criminal act. Requiring focus
on past mental state as well as causal relationship raises a series of questions peripheral
to the main problems in this Article: Is it the function of concurrence in time of mental
disease and criminal act to establish causal connection by presumption? If that is its func-
tion has it become an anomaly under Durham which also specifically requires the intro-
duction of evidence and a determination on causal relationship between the mental disease
and criminal act? Does the time requirement invite treating mental disease as a discrete
phenomenon and thus preclude jury examination of causal relationship when it is found
1960]
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whether the offender shall be held subject to criminal sanctions; commitment
is not directly an issue, but automatically follows an acquittal by reason of in-
sanity. In effect, the defendant, by raising the defense of insanity-and he
alone can raise it '8 -- postpones a determination of his present mental health
and acknowledges the right of the state, upon accepting his plea, to detain him
for diagnosis, care, and custody in a mental institution until certain specified
conditions are met. And it should be noted that the defendant is presumed, or
in such special proceedings as in the Hough case, actually found, to be suffi-
ciently in contact with reality at the time of his trial to comprehend the nature
and consequences of the variety of pleas and defenses available to him.19 With-
in these limits, commitment via the criminal process is initiated by the defend-
ant and thus is more akin to "voluntary" than "involuntary" civil commitment.
From the time of commitment by either procedure the issues coalesce and
the crucial problems emerge: who, what reasons, and what circumstances are
to determine readiness for release? An examination of these problems requires,
first of all, an analysis of how to define "dangerous to himself or others." In
a democratic society, we believe, the function of delimiting dangerousness for
release purposes belongs to the community. Translating community values and
policies into an operational definition of dangerousness has been assigned ini-
tially to legislators and then to judges as construers of legislative determina-
tions, and not to any particular administrative or professional group, including
psychiatrists. This does not imply that psychiatrists as representatives of their
profession or as members of the community have no duty to inform legislators
and judges with regard to making such decisions as the meaning of "dangerous
to himself or others." But it does imply that, when engaged as experts to par-
ticipate in a hearing to determine an individual's readiness for release, they
are not to define "dangerousness," but are, rather, to ascertain whether the in-
dividual is likely or not to engage in conduct which has been characterized as
"dangerous." More specifically, in deciding whether individual "x" is sufficient-
ly "dangerous" not to be released, the psychiatrist as expert is to perform a
purely diagnostic and prognostic function concerning the likely behavior of the
that at the time of the crime the accused was in remission or a lucid state? Would deletion
of the time factor free psychiatrists of the impossible task of trying to establish mental
state at a point in the past and instead leave them to testify as to the possible causal re-
lationship between the underlying mental illness and the offense? For an illustration of the
confusion between the causation element and the "at the time of the offense" requisite, see
Dukes v. United States, No. 15277, D.C. Cir., Apr. 7, 1960.
18. Report of the-Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, §§ 442-44 (1953) ; Boyd
v. People, 108 Colo. 289, 294, 116 P.2d 193, 195 (1941). For a discussion of some of the
policy issues involved, see Samuels, Can the Prosecution Allege That th'e Accused Is Sane?,
[1960] CLUm. L.R_ 435.
19. The question of the defendant's "sanity" may be in issue at several points in the
criminal process. For example, the functions and implications of the test of competency to
stand trial must be distinguished from those of the test of competency to commit a crime,
i.e., the test of insanity as a defense. Both courts and psychiatrists frequently confuse these
tests as well as others involving mental health. Durham v. United States, 237 F.2d 760
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
[Vol. 70:225
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person. But in deciding whether behavior "x" (e.g., homosexual acts) is suffi-
ciently "dangerous" to preclude release, the psychiatrist, as any other member
of the community, may attempt to influence legislative and court decisions by
expressing his value preferences. Making such a distinction among the roles
psychiatrists may play at different points in the decision-making process should
alert them, as well as all participants, to the extent to which value preferences
permeate expert judgments. This, in turn, should prompt careful scrutiny of
conclusionary statements qualified by such phrases as "on the basis of my pro-
fessional opinion. . . ," expose those views which primarily reflect the psychia-
trist's value preferences, and thus facilitate identification of decision points at
which the psychiatrist should minimize his value orientation and at which the
community has the right to establish policy. This is not to suggest that experts
are to avoid, or can avoid, value judgments, but rather that they openly articu-
late them as such.
20
While we share Szasz preference for minimizing deprivations of liberty as
a criterion for assessing effectiveness of release procedures, we do not share
his view that this value will best be protected by leaving solely to hospital
psychiatrists the decision to release "should they wish to do so."21 The Szasz
position, though unclear, seems to be that the psychiatrist's personal concept of
"dangerousness" is not a variable in his decision to release and that "dangerous-
ness" becomes operative only if the decision must be shared with the courts.
Szasz seems to conclude that unless "dangerousness" is eliminated as a variable
in the release-decision, "hospitalization" becames "preventive jailing," "pa-
tients" become "prisoners," "psychiatrists" become "jailers," and "judges"
become "psychiatrists." Finally, he asserts that as a result of such mystical trans-
formations the period of detention in mental institutions is extended for those
acquitted by reason of insanity beyond that which would be generally the practice
of psychiatrists acting alone. This assertion would be correct if, in making de-
cisions to release, psychiatrists were trained and capable of excluding consider-
ations, both conscious and unconscious, of a patient's "dangerousness" to himself
or others. Szasz implies that this is his view by failing to identify the operative
factors in what he calls a "psychiatrist['s] ... own best judgment [with regard
to] read [iness] to leave a hospital. '22 But we find it difficult to believe that there
20. This is in keeping with the view expressed in the "Report of Panel on Science and
Human Welfare" of the American Association for the Advancement of Science which
says, in part:
With respect to the process of decision-making the scientist's role is simply that
of an informed citizen. Like any other citizen; the scientist-is free to express his
opinions regarding alternative solutions for matters of public policy and will per-
haps join with like-minded citizens in a group effort to foster the solution he prefers.
This role does not derive from the scientist's professional competence or obliga-
tions but only from his citizenship, and therefore it bears no direct relationship to
his professional organizations.
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1960, § C, p. 6, cols. 5-6.
21. Szasz, supra note 10, at 59.
22. Id. at 60.
1960]
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is not lurking in the quoted phrase recognition that psychiatrists are trained
to, and do, take into account a patient's potential for doing harm to himself or
others, however defined. The assertion that release would be expedited if psy-
chiatrists had sole responsibility would, then, be correct only if it could be
established, and for this there is no available data, (1) that among psychiatrists
there is a consensus about the meaning and degree of "dangerousness" which
precludes the release of a patient and (2) that compared with a court's concept
of "dangerousness" a psychiatrist's is less severe or more permissive. More-
over, we know of no reason which even suggests a direct correlation between
shorter periods of detention and leaving to each psychiatrist or hospital board
alone the function of determining the meaning and degree of "dangerousness."
Likewise, we find no reason which suggests a necessary correlation between
longer periods of detention and a sharing of the release decision by psychia-
trists and the courts.
The problem still remains of ascertaining and evaluating the process by which
the crucial phrase "dangerous to himself or others" is to be given meaning.
The task of defining and redefining, on the basis of actual cases, the meaning
of "dangerousness" for release purposes has been delegated to the courts and
mental health administrators.2 3 The desirability of this procedure, in terms of
reducing threats to community well-being, maximizing individual dignity and,
more particularly, minimizing deprivations of liberty, rests upon its capacity
to force into view those rarely articulated factors which are crucial variables in
psychiatric and judicial decisions to release or detain. Interaction in specific
cases between the court's inherent interest in civil rights and the psychiatrists'
primary interest in therapy will be openly define and redefine criteria for release
which amalgamate and reflect these values. In addition, by this sharing of
responsibility the traditional tasks of each discipline are restored and anxiety
concerning community responses toward the release of any given individual
can be minimized as a decisional factor.2 4 That this is more than mere fantasy
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VIII 1960).
24. Such anxiety is reflected in the following comment by a psychiatrist:
In the case of persons who have been arrested, particularly if charged with serious
offenses, a greater degree of conservatism must be practised in the matter of release,
in consideration of the attitudes of the public.
Thus, the hospital administration is torn between two urges, one, to release as
many patients as possible, the other to pursue a reasonably conservative policy so
as not to cause undue risk to the patient or to those about him. It may even be that
we are too conservative !
Overholser, The Present Status of Problems of Release of Patients from Mental Hospitals,
29 PsYcHiARmic QUARTERLY 372-80 (1955). For another psychiatric expression of other
anxieties which seemed to suggest the desirability of court participation in the decision to
release, see H.R. PEP,. No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1955).
Dr. Guttmacher was asked the following question and gave the following answer:
Question: Do you think it advisable to have a statute which would provide that
where a person is found not guilty of a crime solely by reason of insanity that he
[Vol. 70:225
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is illustrated by the appellate decision and subsequent events in the Hough
case, as well as by other appellate interpretations of the statute.
The Hough decision,25 for example, did not close the door to liberty for Miss
Hough. Rather, by enunciating guides for conditional release, which the appel-
late court had already established for unconditional release,26 it stimulated a
series of interchanges between psychiatrist and lawyer which led to her con-
ditional release. It reaffirmed, particularly for the trial judge, that length of
confinement must not be related to punishment, and that consideration must
only be given to a patient's condition, his need for treatment and the public's
safety. Further, the decision advised that trial courts fulfill their role with re-
gard to conditional releases simply by deciding whether "the evidence supports
the hospital's determination that in all reasonable likelihood the patient's tem-
porary absence from the hospital under specified conditions will not endanger
others." 7 As a consequence the Hough application was returned to the trial
court for rehearing with specific provision for the introduction of supplemen-
tary evidence. Had a rehearing taken place without the introduction of new
evidence it is more than likely that Miss Hough would have been denied re-
lease. Not only would it have been reasonable for the trial judge to have con-
cluded on the basis of the testimony by Drs. Overholser and Karpman that she
was still acutely psychotic, but also, especially from testimony by Dr. Karp-
man, that she was still "potentially dangerous" at this time.2 8 In addition, the
shall ... be released only on a certificate of the superintendent and a finding by the
court that he is no longer a danger to himself or to the community?
Answer by Dr. Guttmacher:
[A] s a psychiatrist I have a great interest in the law's role that it plays in giving
people and the community as a whole the feeling of security in these insecure times
in which we live.
It is very important for people to feel comfortable and secure, ....
It might be unnecessary, and, perhaps, some psychiatrists may feel in psychiatry
-well, there are some people in state hospitals or Government institutions who are
men with a conscience and they are not going to let some man run around the streets
who is dangerous to people; I think in most cases-I would say in the vast majority
of cases, or, perhaps, in all-that is true. On the other hand, I think this is a very
special area and I think a man who is in a hospital because he has committed a crime,
for which he has been exculpated, is a different individual from the individual who
has been sent there as a mental case; and, therefore, I think, from a technical point
of view, it might be necessary to have the court be the discharging agency.
The hearing reporter added: "The above statement was concurred in by Dr. Winfred Over-
holser, Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital."
25. Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
26. Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Rosenfield v. Overholser, 262
F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
27. Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1958). (Emphasis added.)
28. Q. In your opinion is Edith L. Hough the aggressive type of paranoid? A. [Dr.
Karpman] Yes, she is the aggressive type-as evidenced by the fact that she took
measures of her own in killing the man. That is aggressiveness.
Q. In your opinion is an aggressive paranoid potentially dangerous? A. It is con-
ceded universally an aggressive paranoid is dangerous. I would even say that univer-
1960]
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conditions for release proposed in the initial application were not sufficiently
detailed to have permitted the judge to conclude that her release would not
threaten public safety. But new evidence was introduced: the attorneys for
Miss Hough, alerted by the experience at the first hearing and the appellate
decision, challenged the reappointment of one of the psychiatrists as her ex-
aminer. They successfully and appropriately argued that because of his life-
long personal relationship with the Hough family and his personal feelings to-
ward her it would be "impossible" for him to conduct an interview with her
"in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect." 29 On the basis of new
diagnostic evaluations by psychiatrists not personally involved with the Hough
family, and a more detailed and meaningful presentation of the conditions
specified for release,3 0 the trial judge, abiding by the new standards, granted
her application for release.3'
sally we think that any paranoid schizophrenic is potentially dangerous, because one
can never tell when the meekness and submissiveness may suddenly turn around and
become aggressive.
Q. Would you say Edith L. Hough at this time is potentially dangerous because
she has schizophrenia, paranoid type? A. I would rather not answer this question
directly. Ask me whether a paranoid schizophrenic is potentially dangerous, and I
would say yes.
Q. You would say yes? A. Yes.
Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
29. Memorandum for Defendant, p. 4, United States v. Hough, Criminal No. 566-57,
D.D.C., March 4, 1960. Order, United States v. Hough, Criminal No. 566-57, D.D.C.,
March 14, 1960.
30. Compare the plan submitted with the first application:
The plan under which we recommend that the conditional release be granted is that
in accordance with the continuation of a total plan of rehabilitation Miss Hough be
permitted to leave Saint Elizabeth's Hospital to go to the city of Washington, D.C.,
unaccompanied in an effort to obtain employment. It is recommended that this plan
be carried out under very close hospital supervision and that she be subject at all
times during the period of her conditional release to the supervision of the Social
Service Department of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital and that she report to Saint Eliza-
beth's Hospital for examinations at such times as are designated by the authorities
of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital.
Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1959), with that for the second
application:
Conditional release is recommended for the purpose of providing Miss Hough with
the rehabilitative support which is considered psychiatrically indicated. Her mother's
home is available to her, and the Social Service Department of the hospital has been
made familiar with the case to provide supervision and support outside the hospital.
Our plans include Miss Hough's returning to the hospital at weekly intervals to
start'for [sic] continued progress interviews with a staff psychiatrist familiar with
her case. Work opportunities are presently available to her and are recommended
as part of the treatment procedure. By a plan which involves Miss Bough's living
with her mother, under the community support of Social Service, and with regular
psychiatric interviews with a physician in whom she has demonstrated confidence,
the public safety is assured.
Letter From W. Overholser to the United States District Court, Wash., D.C., Feb. 3, 1960.
31. Order of U.S. District Court, D.C., Criminal No. 566-57, May 3, 1960.
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The task of pouring substantive content into "potential 'danger,'" which the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has called "the heart of the test
for retention or release,"3 2 has just begun. Some of the difficulties of definition
are being uncovered not only in hearings to review applications for release sub-
mitted by the mental hospital, but also in habeas corpus proceedings in which
the patient challenges the mental hospital's decision to continue confinement.
Two major issues arise in these proceedings: one, what kinds of behavior are
sufficiently threatening to be called "dangerous" and two, with what degree of
certainty must the prognosis establish the likelihood of the kind or kinds of
behavior designated "dangerous" occurring over what period of time.
With regard to the first issue, no criteria for "dangerousness" have been
precisely articulated. The major problem is to identify criteria for evaluating
the appropriateness of the many possible responses to the question posed: as-
suming mental illness requiring some form of treatment or care, what behavior
should be classified dangerous enough to authorize deprivation of liberty by
continued detention in a mental institution or by release under supervision?
Dangerous behavior might be construed to include: (1) only the crime for
which the insanity defense was successfully raised; (2) all crimes; (3) only
felonious crimes (as opposed to misdemeanors) ; (4) only crimes for which
a given maximum sentence or more is authorized; (5) only crimes categorized
as violent; (6) only crimes categorized as harmful, physical or psychological,
reparable or irreparable, to the victim; (7) any conduct, even if not labelled
criminal, categorized as violent, harmful, or threatening; (8) any conduct which
may provoke violent retaliatory acts; (9) any physical violence towards one-
self; (10) any combination of these. More or other than the kind of offense
for which the defense was raised was intended, for the statute specifically adds
dangerousness to self as a basis for confinement.33 However, the D.C. court
has not been challenged to further sort out the kinds of behavior to be classified
as "dangerous" or to identify the values to be minimized and maximized. But
it has already recognized the existence of these problems and has registered
concern, for example, about the possible need for handling differently a patient
with homicidal tendencies and one with a potential for forging checks. 34 In
the absence of court-created standards, the psychiatrist, it might be argued, is
in an intolerable position. Actually the opposite is true, for he Is presently free
to apply for a patient's release on what has been called "his own best judg-
ment."' 35 The psychiatrist, trained to seek release as soon as there is therapeutic
indication for such a decision, can face the court with release applications in-
volving a wide variety of behavioral pathology and thus prompt a series of
32. Ragsdale v. Overholser, No. 15437, D.C. Cir., June 23, 1960, at 10.
33. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VIII 1960).
34. Contrary to common belief, the defense of insanity is not limited to murder or to
capital crimes. Ragsdale v. Overholser, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir., No. 15437, June
23, 1960, pp. 10, 14; Overholser v. Russell, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir. No. 15,536,
June 23, 1960, p. 4.
35. Szasz, supra at note 10.
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decisions giving substantive content to "dangerousness." Coupled with patient
challenges to denials for release by psychiatrists, these applications will permit
court and psychiatrist to examine the values operative in their decisions. This
in turn will permit the psychiatrist to more easily differentiate those aspects
of his decision primarily determined by his expertise from those determined by
his value preferences.3" In sharing with the court those aspects of decision in
which community values are at stake the psychiatrist need neither be apologetic
for having values, nor be misled into feeling that his role as expert is being
usurped.
3 7
With regard to the second issue, the D.C. court has emphasized from the
very first construction of the statute that the psychiatrist is not required to
"give an absolute guarantee that the patient will never again be mentally ill or
dangerous. Reasonable foreseeability ... is the test." 38 But before such verbal
admonitions are consistently applied, an understanding of their significance
must be developed by providing, as is done by statute, an opportunity for case
by case review of the action of the participants-the trial judge, the lawyer,
and the psychiatrist. Through time the ambit of the degree of certainty possible
will be more clearly communicated. This should eliminate such uncalled-for
psychiatric responses as that given to a question in the first Hough hearing
about the probability of the patient's doing "hann to herself or others ?"
Well, there is that possibility with a great many people, some of whom
have never been in mental hospitals. I can't make any guarantee about
permanence, or even about the conduct.3 9
And minimally, in the event of such a response, a court should be alert to
advise the psychiatric witness that certainty is not expected. Nor should courts
expect a consensus among experts about the potential dangerousness of any
patient. Whenever a consensus exists concerning the likelihood of "dangerous"
behavior, a court must accept this view as a factor in its release determination.
However, in the more likely absence of such a consensus among experts mak-
ing prognoses about human conduct, a court must finally resolve for release
purposes the differences of opinion about potential dangerousness uncovered
36. So far as the analyst is concerned Hartmann emphasizes:
There are . . .the personal moral valuations of the analyst with respect to the
material presented in analysis. One cannot deny the actuality of [this] factor-it
is, above all, the natural outcome of the analyst's having his own value system ....
But... this ... factor is best kept in the background in contacts with the patient;
also, that in order to achieve this the analyst must be clearly aware of his own
valuations and must know how to distinguish them from statements of fact. It has
been doubted whether such reserve is really possible. Experience decides that it is,
at least to a very considerable degree.
HARTMANN, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MORAL VALUES 54-55 (1960).
37. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1960, p. 6.
38. Rosenfield v. Overholser, 262 F.2d 34, 35 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1958). (Emphasis added.)
39. Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 468 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dissenting
opinion).
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by the much maligned battle of the experts.40 This is as it should be. But with-
out deluding themselves about their ability to predict, courts, in assuming this
role, must continue to play the value-weighing function of balancing the un-
predictable risks to individual liberty and public safety.
4 1
But whatever role is assigned to lawyers and psychiatrists in the release
process, there is in fact a real danger of unwarranted detention. The wording
of the statute might invite an application which conflicts with the statute's
therapeutic purpose and with the fundamental function of the criminal law to
safeguard every individual from the imposition of sanctions solely for his poten-
tial dangerousness.42 Sickness of the individual and his need of treatment or
care is the only justification for using "likelihood of dangerousness" as a basis
for deprivation of liberty.43 Since "recovery of sanity" and the unlikelihood of
dangerousness are requisites for release, the question arises: what disposition
is to be made of those acquitted by reason of insanity who remain dangerous-
whatever meaning will be given to that word-but who have "recovered sanity"
at least to the extent that they could no longer be held had they been civilly
40. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARcHrvEs OF CRI.xN.AL Psyr-
CHODYNAMICS 221 (1959).
41. Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher in response to a request for his opinion of the first
Hough application for release said in part:
I don't run a hospital. I don't have the decisions to make as to when patients should
be discharged or not. I don't for a moment feel that I have the right or the com-
petence to preempt a judge's function in deciding what risks the community should
take.
Brief for Appellee, p. 8, Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
42. In a habeas corpus proceeding challenging detention for civil commitment, the
court ordered release despite the following psychiatric report from Saint Elizabeth's Hos-
pital:
Dallas 0. Williams at the present time shows no evidence of active mental illness
but ... he is potentially dangerous to others and if released is likely to repeat his
patterns of criminal behavior, and might commit homicide.
The court said:
Many persons who are released to society upon completing the service of sentences
in criminal cases are just as surely potential menaces to society as is this petitioner,
having a similar pattern of anti-social behavior, lack of occupational adjustment,
and absence of remorse or anxiety; yet the courts have no legal basis of ordering
their continued confinement on mere apprehension of future unlawful acts, and must
wait until another crime against society is committed or they are found insane in
proper mental health proceedings before confinement may again be ordered.
II re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D.D.C. 1958).
43. Judge Fahy in a concurring opinion goes further saying:
[T]his mandatory commitment provision rests upon a supposition, namely, the
necessity for treatment of the mental condition which led to the acquittal by reason
of insanity. And this necessity for treatment presupposes in turn that treatment will
be recorded.
Ragsdale v. Overholser, United States Court of Appeals N9, 15,437, June 23, 1960, pp.
13-14.
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committed? Continued detention would be the statutory answer.44 But to hold
a patient solely for potential dangerousness would snap the thin line between
detention for therapy and detention for retribution. 45 Though the likelihood is
not great that many cases will pose this issue, the possibility of it arising has
increased under the Durham rule.46 The meaning of mental illness for the in-
sanity defense has been construed under Durham to include "psychopathic and
sociopathic personalities,"4 7 even though insanity for civil-commitment pur-
poses excludes, except for the "sexual psychopath," 48 such personality dis-
orders.49 Not to release such persons would in effect be to equate an undefined
"dangerousness" with an undefined mental illness. Since there can be no such
equation, a decision not to release solely on the basis of potential dangerous-
ness would be like a decision not to discharge a tubercular patient-though no
longer infectious-because he is a potential killer or check-forger. The court
might, though it is doubtful, affirm the constitutionality of such denials on the
theory that the patient "voluntarily" accepted these conditions for release by
electing the defense of insanity. Realistically, this would stretch voluntariness
to an absurd, though technically logical, point. Without declaring the statute
unconstitutional, the court, more likely and more appropriately, would ignore
44. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VIII 1960).
45. Confusion in judicial thinking about this matter is illustrated by the following
statement:
Two policies underly [sic] the distinction in treatment between the responsible
and the non-responsible: (1) It is both wrong and foolish to punish where there is
no blame and where punishment cannot correct. (2) The community's security may
be better protected by hospitalization ... than by imprisonment.
Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
'Punish' and 'punishment' are used in policy statement (1) to suggest different
underlying meanings or concepts. The word is first used as a symbol of the vengeance
or retribution function of the criminal law and then used as a symbol of the rehabili-
tation function. Query: If 'punishment,' however defined, were an effective re-
habilitative device would the court find its use objectionable even if blameworthiness
could not be established? Is involuntary confinement for an indefinite period in a
mental hospital any less a deprivation, as the court seems to imply in policy state-
ment (2), than involuntary confinement for a limited period in prison?
Goldstein, J., Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility De-
cisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 546 (1960).
Cf. Brief for Appellee, p. 19, Overholser v. Lynch, No. 15,859, D.C. Cir., 1960, stating:
It is questionable if [St. Elizabeth's Hospital] is a fit place for human habitation.
It is not unfair to state in the light of undisputed testimony upon the subject that
large parts of St. Elizabeth's Hospital have been converted into detention centers,
devoid of any therapeutic program worthy of the name.
46. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
47. Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640, 644 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Blocker v. United
States, 274 F.2d 572, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 87 (1956).
48. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Malone v. Overholzer, 93
F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1950) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3503(1) (1951).
49. In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D.D.C. 1958).
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the "and" connecting the criteria for release.50 The D.C. court has already in-
dicated that this would be done in the reverse situation, suggesting that release
would be authorized for a patient no longer dangerous even "though he has
not 'recovered his sanity.' ,1 Better still, the legislature--here Congress-
should amend the statute r2 to release anyone who has "recovered sanity" and
thus prohibit, if not preclude, deprivation of liberty without therapeutic justi-
fication. 3
Ultimately, if circularity of reasoning is to be avoided, many of the problems
raised by this analysis of the decision to release persons acquitted by reason
of insanity can only be resolved following a detailed reexamination of the func-
tion of the doctrine of criminal responsibility. The need for such a fundamental
study is highlighted by what appears to be a fruitless and frustrating debate
among and between lawyers and psychiatrists in search of a formula for in-
sanity as a defense.
50. Under this construction and with current standards of civil commitment psychopaths,
absolved of criminal responsibility under Durham, could not be detained in either prisons or
hospitals. We recognize, of course, that civil commitment in practice may not work this
way; either because the committing psychiatrist (1) deliberately manipulates nosological
labels to implement his feelings, more as a member of the community than as an expert
that "dangerous" people ought to be confined, or (2) makes a longtitudinal diagnosis which
suggests or reveals an underlying psychosis though a diagnosis in terms of current sympto-
matology would not. Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; In re Wil-
liams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1958). See notes 42 & 45 supra.
51. Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Overholser v. Leach, 257
F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Overholser v. Russel, United States Court of Appeals No.
15,536, June 23, 1960.
52. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VIII 1960).
53. The New York legislature has taken a contrary position. See N.Y. CODE CrAm.
PROC. § 454(3) (6) which provides that a person committed pursuant to an acquittal by
reason of insanity shall be discharged or conditionally released only when this may be done
without danger to himself or others, and that persons so committed may be held in custody
either in an institution of the department of mental hygiene or of the department of cor-
rection. See text and note 45 supra.
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